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POINTS OF LAW OR FACT WHICH THE PETITIONER CLAIMS THE COURT
OMITTED OR MISAPPREHENDED
I.

Uncontroverted material facts are omitted or misapprehended in the courts' statement of the
case which, when properly considered, reveal that the City is in material breach and that the
City acted in bad faith; including:
A. The Court omitted and misapprehended that the City's duty to purchase or lease a sign a
material provision of the Stipulation and the City's failure to purchase or lease was a
material breach.
B. The Court omitted and misapprehended that City's duty to provide valid sign permits
was a material provision and the failure of the City to provide valid permits was a
material breach of the stipulation.
C. The Court omitted and misapprehended the City's breach of its duty to provide a
preference and to publish that preference is a material breach of the stipulation.
D. The Court omitted and misapprehended the City's bad faith in making misrepresentations
to the Court; the City had no interest in the Chamber sign and its declaration to the
court that it had an interest in the sign seeking an order to prevent its removal was
misleading and in bad faith.
E. The Court misapprehended and omitted addressing other bad faith acts of the city. The
Court should address the concerns raised by the appellant.

II.

The Court misapprehended the law and failed to properly apply the law to the the City's
material breach; the Court misapprehended and omitted to observe that the law excuses
performance if the other party is in breach.

III..

This Court failed to apprehend that attorney fees should not have been awarded to the City
since the City had unclean hands; failed to perform; acted in bad faith; and was in material
breach of the stipulation and that attorney fees should be awarded to defendant; in the
alternate the Court failed to address why fees should not be awarded to the defendant since
the city is in breach, demonstrated gross bad faith, and committed the inexcusable act of
making material misrepresentations to a court.

The Court of Appeals reviews "the trial court's factual findings for clear error." Alta Indus.
Ltd. v.Hurst. 846 P.2d 1282, 1286 (Utah 1993). [They] "review the trial court's legal conclusions
for correctness, according no deference to the trial court." United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater
Park Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993).

i

II.

BACKGROUND 1
Plaintiff is the City of Coalville, Defendant, Appellant, operates an advertising sign

company. In 1979 Defendant approached Mayor Ball of Coalville and obtained permission to erect
nine signs within the city limits on 1-80 at a cost of $144. The ordinances then in effect required
that permits be issued by the "city council or its designated representative." The mayor stated in a
letter that nothing else was required to erect its signs in the City. (R: 5, 183; T: 317, Exhibit 32.)
The Defendant erected the signs. In 1982 the City brought a lawsuit alleging that the signs had not
been erected with proper permits. In early 1983 the parties entered into a Stipulation which
provided for settlement and dismissal of the lawsuit. The Stipulation was a product of extensive
negotiations between the parties and their attorneys. The material terms of the Stipulation are: (1)
The City would purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant; (2) The City would issue valid permits
for the signs; (3) The Defendant would remove signs according to a specific schedule; and (4) The
City granted and agreed to publish a preference for the Defendant in their sign policy.
In March 1983, the Defendant attempted to withdraw from the Stipulation. On March 24,
1983 the city council approved the Stipulation, made a decision to purchase a sign, based on
information previously provided by the Defendant, and the Mayor and City Attorney signed it.
However, the City never gave notice of its decision to the Defendant, neither did the City issue
permits at that time; and neither did the City grant or publish any preference in its sign policy.
Late in 1983 the City revised its zoning ordinances becoming effective in 1984. The new
ordinance prohibited off-premises signs. No preference was granted or published.
In 1986 the City demanded removal of a sign which under the schedule in the Stipulation

1

References to these facts are in the previous briefs filed with the court.

1

one was to be removed in 1985,2 and filed and Order to Show Cause. After the Defendant
complained that the City had failed to issue permits, the Mayor prepared and issued sign permits
and sent them to the Defendant in early 1986. These permits were not valid under the 1983-84
ordinance, then current, nor under the previous ordinance.
In 1986 the court found the Stipulation enforceable, over the objections of the Defendant
who claimed that he had withdrawn his approval of the Stipulation. The Defendant appealed only
this issue to the Utah Supreme Court which refused to consider the matter.
The Defendant subsequently removed a sign, and later three more signs..
In 1989 the City brought an Order to Show Cause to remove another sign. In 1986 the
Defendant had erected a sign, under an agreement with the Chamber of Commerce, not associated
with the City. The City misrepresented to the court that the Chamber sign was the sign which was
contemplated by the Stipulation, knowing that the representation was completely false. The City
requested and the court granted an order restricting removal of the Chamber sign. After the
Defendant confirmed that the City did not have an interest in the Chamber sign, it was removed.
Thereafter both parties filed a number of motions, petitions and pleadings, seeking
enforcement of the Stipulation. In December, 1994 the trial court ordered a trial to consider all of
the pending matters. Trial was held in August, 1995. Both parties appealed from the trial court
decision, the Defendant appealing the failure of the trial court to find material breach on the part oz
the City, and the award of attorney fees; the City appealed the award of interest to the Defendant.
The Court of Appeals considered the appeal, reaffirming the trial court in all aspects.

The City demanded the removal of a specific sign, even though the Stipulation granted the
Defendant the right to determine which sign would be removed.

2

II.
UNCONTROVERTED MATERIAL FACTS ARE OMITTED OR
MISAPPREHENDED IN THE COURTS' STATEMENT OF THE CASE WHICH, WHEN
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, REVEAL THAT THE CITY IS IN MATERIAL BREACH
AND THAT THE CITY ACTED IN BAD FAITH,
The Stipulation terms were extensively negotiated with several drafts between the parties.
Both of the attorneys representing the City (Christiansen) and Defendant (Snuffer) in creating the
Stipulation testified that each of these terms were material: (T: 90, 92, 96.)
o
o
o
o
o

The City would either purchase or lease a sign from Defendant
The City would issue valid permits for the signs
The City would grant the Defendant a preference for new signs
The City would publish this preference in their sign policy (ordinance)
The Defendant would remove signs according to a set schedule

Both attorneys understood the legal meaning of the term "material." Their nonconflicting
testimony that it was the intent of the parties that these terms were each material should be
presumptive. This Court omitted this facts and misapprehended the meaning.
A. The Court Omitted and Misapprehended That the City's Duty to Purchase or Lease
a Sign a Material Provision of the Stipulation and the City's Failure to Purchase or
Lease Was a Material Breach.
Stipulation paragraph 1 requires the City to purchase or lease a sign from the Defendant.
This provision was not present in all of the drafts. Although the record reflects that the idea of the
purchase may have been suggested by the mayor, the final draft was not approved by the Defendant
until it was included. Attorneys for both parties considered the lease/purchase a material element of
the Stipulation. The fact that the Defendant refused to accept a draft unless the lease/purchase
provisions were present is indicative that the term is material. 'During... August 15, 1982 through
March 31, 1983, the parties considered various drafts of the Stipulation... necessitated by concern
solely over paragraph 1. " Affidavit of Terry Christiansen , City Attorney. (R: 37). The undisputed
fact is that the Defendant refused to approve the Stipulation without paragraph 1, containing the
3

provision that the City would purchase or lease a sign. This fact satisfies the test cited in
Polvglvcoat Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449 (Utah 1979) at page 451.
Further, the Defendant testified of the significance of having on his signs a sign advertising
for the City. It would provide prestige and credibility to the Defendant's business. (T:304) There
would also be significant political benefit to advertise for the City on the signs, softening the
attitude of the City regarding the remaining signs. Finally the obvious economic benefit that the
Defendant would receive payment for the value of the sign supports that this duty was material.
This Court omitted and misapprehended that the City's duty to purchase a sign was a
material element of the Stipulation, and that the City's breach was a material breach.
B. The Court Omitted and Misapprehended The City's Duty to Provide Valid Sign
Permits Was a Material Provision and the Failure of the City to Provide Valid Permits
Was a Material Breach of the Stipulation.
The City filed its lawsuit based on its claim that there was a technical violation in the
licenses obtained to build the signs. Defendant facially complied with the pre-1983 ordinances.
Nevertheless, the City filed suit claiming that the licenses were not valid permits. Thus when the
Stipulation was negotiated it was of utmost importance to the Defendant that he obtain valid
permits.(T:232) Obviously that last thing that the Defendant would want is to be given permits
which could be challenged again - obtaining valid permits is a material term.
The pre-1983 ordinance, as interpreted by the City, required that only the city council
approve the issuance of permits. There is no record that the city council made such approval
between 1983 and 1986 when the new permits were issued. The 1983-84 ordinance required that
permits be approved by the City Zoning Administrator, however off-premises signs were
prohibited, therefor it was illegal to issue the permits. So although the Defendant was given
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'permits' by the mayor3 they were of no greater value than the original licenses-permits! (T:232)
The City never denied that the permits are invalid under the City ordinances, but argued
that since the City did not object to these permits that they are valid. This argument is self-serving
and not credible. The administration of Mayor Ball accepted the permits he issued; the
administration of Mayor Johnson accepts the permits he issued; however just as Mayor Johnson
rejected the Ball permits, the Defendant is at risk that a subsequent mayor may reject the Johnson
permits. Even more significantly, no third party interested in purchasing the Defendant's signs can
rely on the validity of the permits, markedly decreasing the value of the signs.
The Defendant did not get valid permits, the permits are not recognized as credible or
marketable by experts in the sign industry. (T:43) The Defendant would have never entered into the
Stipulation without being guaranteed valid permits. This term is material. The City breached its
obligation to deliver valid permits, and it is a material breach of the Stipulation.
This Court never addressed the breach of the City relating to the permits, and did not even
note the Defendant's claim in its facts or analysis. This is a serious omission by the Court.
C. The Court Omitted and Misapprehended The City's Breach of its Duty to Provide
a Preference and to Publish That Preference Is a Material Breach of the Stipulation.
The duty to provide a preference and to publish that preference are two separate duties, but
are considered together for the sake of brevity. There is immense value of having a City endorsed
preference which is published in official City policies for prestige and marketing purposes. The
City admitted it never created a preference nor was any preference published in the "official sign
policy" of the City, although the City sign and zoning ordinances were revised twice since 1983.

3

The record reflects that the mayor took it upon himself to dictate the language of the permits to a
secretary, then signed the permits and sent them to the Defendant in 1986. (T: 239)

5

The City excused its failure to make and publish the preference because it prohibited offpremises signs in the new 1983 ordinance. This excuse is unavailing for several reasons including
that the Defendant lost the value of the preference and its publishment at least from the date of the
signing of the Stipulation until the new ordinance was made effective. The City's breach extended
at least from March 24, 1983 to the effective date of the new ordinance. The Defendant also lost
the value of the publishing of the preference thereafter, notwithstanding off-premises signs were
prohibited. Just having the preference published was of tremendous marketing value. If offpremises signs were ever made legal again the value of the preference would be enhanced.
The Stipulation language does not limited the preference to off-premises signs. The
Defendant has a right to a preference for any new signs. The Court omitted this fact
Failure to make and publish the preference was a material consideration for Defendant
entering into the Stipulation. The Defendant was giving up his right to indefinite maintenance of
his signs, and he desired to protect any rights to preserve, reinstall those signs, or any other sign
which may offset his potential losses. Even if, for the sake of argument, the preference only
extended to off-premise signs, the City had a duty to comply with the spirit of the Stipulation to
afford the Defendant the benefit of his bargain and publish. Defendant rejected drafts without these
provisions. The attorneys who negotiated the Stipulation affirmed that this condition was material.
The City's breach is material and inexcusable, it never made the slightest attempt to comply.
This Court omitted any analysis of the City's breach in granting or publishing the
preference. This misapprehension and omission should be rectified.
D. The Court Omitted and Misapprehended the City's Bad Faith in Making
Misrepresentations to the Court; the City Had No Interest in the Chamber Sign and its
Declaration to the Court That it Had an Interest in the Sign Seeking an Order to
Prevent its Removal Was Misleading and in Bad Faith.
6

In 1986 the Defendant negotiated with the Chamber of Commerce to erect a sign for it. The
Chamber is separate and distinct from the City. There are no documents or evidence which tie the
Chamber and the City together, in fact the Chamber president declared that they were separate, ana
City Attorney Grant McFarlane affirmed that fact. Nevertheless in 1989, the City requested and got
an order which required that the Chamber sign not be removed. MacFarlane did not represent the
Chamber, nor was the Chamber before the court. The City and McFarlane had no right to request
that the Chamber sign not be removed. This act was illegal, unethical and in gross bad faith.
MacFarlane and the City should be punished for their contempt, but ironically the court awarded
the City attorney fees for prosecuting the Defendant for his contempt which arose from the
misrepresentation made by MacFarlane and the City. There should be no merit in hypocrisy.
This Court noted that the City made this misrepresentation, but did not make any analysis,
which was a serious omission and misapprehension of the facts and law.
E. The Court Misapprehended and Omitted Addressing Other Bad Faith Acts of the
City. The Court Should Address the Concerns Raised by the Appellant.
The Court ignored the many bad faith acts of the City. Good faith is defined::
Thus, an implied covenant of goodfaith forbids arbitrary action by one party that
disadvantages the other. Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock
Co.. Inc.. 706 P.2d 1028, 1037 (Utah 1985)
Resource forbids the following arbitrary acts of the City done in bad faith or absence of good faith:
1. The initial suit filed by the City was in bad faith because the City never believed
that it could prevail based on the existing law and their own ordinances.4

Terry Christiansen... suggested that we made a decision now that this can be settled. He advised
buying the sign so that we have a chance of getting the rest of the signs down, in the future. If we don't buy the
sign, we will be back in litigation and with our present zoning ordinances, we would probably lose. If the City buys
the sign then they will have to maintain it. As long as the contract and lease on the property. Terry Christiansen
said we have four choices: I. Sign the agreement and buy the sign so that all of the signs will be down in 20 years,
2. Go with the lawsuit that we will probably lose. Leaving the signs up indefinitely. 3. Drop the lawsuit and the

7

2. The City voted to purchase a sign but never notified the Defendant.
3. The City did not tender the purchase price.
4. The City intentionally waited about three years before issuing permits for the
signs so they would issue after the new ordinance made off-premise signs illegal.. (T-28
and following also note T at 220 and following.)
5. The City issued permits which were invalid.
6. The City never created the preference for the Defendant.
7. The City never published the preference for the Defendant
8. The City revised its ordinances twice and made off premise signs illegal.
9. The City claimed an interest in the Chamber sign knowing it had no interest..
10. The City sought and obtained a order restricting Defendant from removing the
Chamber sign, which it had no right to seek.
11. The City prosecuted the Defendant for contempt in removing the Chamber sign,
knowing that it had deceived the court for the order.
12. The City repeatedly demanded that the Defendant remove his signs without
tendering the slightest indication of performance - (except for the invalid permits.)
The City has unclean hands. The City never acted sincerely. All it wanted was for the signs
to be removed - it never intended to perform. This Court omitted addressing these issues.
III.
THE COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT WHEN THE LAW IS APPLIED
PROPERLY TO THE UNCONTROVERTED FACTS THE CITY IS IN MATERIAL
BREACH OF THE STIPULATION.
The City is in material breach of the Stipulation because it did not notify the Defendant of
its decision to purchase; did not tender the purchase price; did not issue valid permits; did not
provide a preference for the Defendant; and did not publish that preference in the official sign
policy of the City. Each of these duties were considered material by both of the attorneys who
drafted and negotiated the Stipulation for both parties. The Defendant would not sign any of the
draft stipulations without each of these terms, particularly paragraph 1. The City breached every
duty it had - there is no reasonable way the City cannot be found in material breach.

signs will be up as long as he wants them, or 4. Condemn them. Russell S. Judd made the motion that we purchase
the sign in order to close the litigation. Colleen R. Sargent, second the motion. All Aves. but Grant Geary who
opposed. The Mayor and Attorney signed the Order of Dismissal. Exhibit 26 (Emphasis added.)

8

The law defining material breach is stated by the Utah Supreme Court:
[CJertainly a failure of performance which "defeats the very object of the contract"
or "(is) of such prime importance that the contract would not have been made if
default in the particular had been contemplated" is a material failure.... Polyglycoat
Corp. v. Holcomb. 591 P.2d 449, 451 (Utah 1979).
The Stipulation's object was to get the signs removed and to compensate the Defendant for
the loss of his signs. If the Defendant failed to remove signs he would be in breach; likewise if the
City failed to (l)buy or lease a sign; (2) provide valid permits; and (3) prepare and publish a
preference the City would be in breach. Neither party would settle without these terms.
There is actual compensation and prestige for Defendant get advertising for the City on his
signs. Breach of this obligation satisfies the requirements of material breach since (a) the Defendant
testified that the purchase was material, i.e., he would not have entered into the Stipulation withouf
. the requirement; (b) the drafts of the Stipulation with the accompanying comments of the attorneys
show that the Defendant would not approve the drafts without the purchase/lease requirement; and
(c) the attorneys for both parties testified that this term was material to the agreement. At trial the
City did not provide any testimony or evidence which controverted these facts. The finding of the
trial court is not supported by the facts and evidence; this Court's order omits many of these facts.
The lawsuit brought by the City did not mention a sign for the City, there was no reason to
mention it. A stipulation is a contract L & A Drywall. Inc. v. Witmore Construction Co., 608 P.2d
626 (Utah 1980). As such it contains elements of any contract including consideration. The City
was going to get the signs removed; in exchange the Defendant was going to get the benefit of (a) a
lease/purchase of a sign; (b) valid incontestable permits; (c) a preference for future signs; and (d)
that preference published. The Defendant did not get any one of those promised benefits. The

9

record shows that the Defendant rejected stipulation drafts without some of these elements. He
certainly would have rejected a stipulation without all benefits. Neither the trial court nor this
Court noted any single benefit conferred by the City under the Stipulation. Yet this Court
infers that since the lawsuit did not mention the sign for the City that the City's duty to
purchase/lease is not material. This is a serious misapprehension of fact and law.
The Stipulation was a compromise so the City gets the signs would be removed, and for the
Defendant to get the above four benefits. Without mutual benefits, the Stipulation fails for lack of
consideration. The Stipulation recites consideration for both, but the City failed to tender. Rules of
contract interpretation follow, but the Court omitted discussing them.
The court misapprehended the purpose of the Stipulation. It was to settle the pending case,
and was a compromise. There were material duties for both parties. If the court's language is not
rectified, it will be creating law that settlement stipulations terms can only be enforced to the extent
that the stipulation terms are reflected in issues raised in a lawsuit. Such a reading will have a
severe adverse effect on parties who attempt to settle cases. It is the policy of the courts to
encourage settlement on terms acceptable to the parties. It is not the duty of the court to second
guess what terms are important to the parties to settle their disputes, but to enforce those
agreements. The court should rely on the statements of the negotiating parties as to what is
material; and the evidence supporting those statements. The Court failed to do that in its opinion.
Once established that the City breached, two questions follow: First, whether the Defendant
had a duty to perform when the City was in breach; and Second what is the remedy for the breach?
The City accepted the Stipulation and simultaneously decided to purchase. For terms on
which the Stipulation is silent, the court can imply the necessary terms to provide a reasonable
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effect to the agreement. Once the City made its decision to purchase it had a duty to convey it to
the Defendant. Without that notice, there is no duty on the part of the Defendant to further
perform.5 The City had other duties which should be performed before the duties of the Defendant
arose, i.e., to provide valid permits, produce a preference and to publish that preference. It is
illogical to assume that the Defendant should be denied the benefit of these items for almost three
years and until after he removed a sign. It is required that the City should demonstrate its good faith
and tender these benefits in a timely and reasonable manner, and certainly before a sign is removed.
Once a sign is removed it may be difficult or impossible to get it re-installed if the City should fail
to perform. The City never tendered these benefits, although they could be performed timely.6
The Court failed to apprehend that the City is also obligated to tender its performance before
demanding performance by the Defendant. Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp.. 883 P.2d 295, 301
(Utah App. 1994) "[A] party seeing to enforce a contract must prove performance of its own
obligations under the contract. " The City never properly performed on any element, nor did it
tender. Utah law is clear that a person is not obligated to perform if the other party is in breach.
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp.. 883 P.2d 295 (Utah App. 1994) is instructive:
The law is well settled that the material breach by one party to a contract excuses
further performance by the nonbreaching part. See Sanders v. Sharp. 840 P. 2d 796,
806 (Utah App. 1992): Wright v. Westside Nursery. 787 P.2d 508, 516 (Utah App.
1990). Holbrook, 883 P.2d at 301.
The City never properly performed any part of its duties, it did not purchase or lease a sign; it did

This reflects the fact that the Defendant already had conveyed the necessary information to the
City for it to make the decision to purchase or lease.
6

The City should have notified of its decision to purchase in March 1983 and should have also sent
valid permits then; and it should have published the preference no later than when the sign ordinance was revised in
late 1983, although there was no reason to publish something shortly after the signing as a showing of good faith..
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not provide valid permits; it did not create the preference, nor publish the preference. This is
complete and total breach by the City. The duty of the Defendant to perform never legally arose.
With the City in material breach of the Stipulation, the remedy afforded to the Defendant
must be decided. The record shows that the Defendant requested rescission to the extent possible
and money damages for the remainder, or for money damages alone. In Polyglycoat Corp. v.
Holcomb. 591 P.2d 499 (Utah, 1979), This Court stated on page 451 as follows:
As a general proposition, a party to a contract has a right to rescission and
an action for restitution as an alternative to an action for damages where
there has been a material breach of contract by the other party.
The Defendant is entitled to a remedy which will make him whole again. There are several options,
including rescinding the Stipulation to the existing signs and awarding money damages for the
removed signs. If the court finds that rescission is not appropriate it can order money damages, it
can also order a combination. All were requested at trial, and briefed on appeal, but this Court
omitted addressing any alternate remedies other than rescission.
Rescission or damages should not be denied using the excuse that the Defendant refused to
remove the signs. As shown above, the Defendant's duty to perform never arose. It is improper to
deny recovery for failure to perform when the City was already in breach. It is the City who should
be punished because it did not perform. Further, the City did not suffered any damages. (R:277)
The Defendant, on the other hand, lost thousands of dollars in revenue and saw the sales value of
his signs seriously impaired because he cannot provide valid permits. (T:320, et seq.)
This Court failed to apprehend that (1) the City was in material breach; (2) the Defendant
was not under a duty to perform while the City was in breach; (3) the City was obliged to tender
performance before demanding performance; and (4) alternate remedies are available for breach.

12

IV.
THIS COURT FAILED TO APPREHEND THAT ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD
NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED TO THE CITY SINCE THE CITY HAD UNCLEAN
HANDS; FAILED TO PERFORM; ACTED IN BAD FAITH; AND WAS IN MATERIAL
BREACH OF THE STIPULATION AND THAT ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE
AWARDED TO DEFENDANT; IN THE ALTERNATE THE COURT FAILED TO
ADDRESS WHY FEES SHOULD NOT BE AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT SINCE
THE CITY IS IN BREACH, DEMONSTRATED GROSS BAD FAITH, AND COMMITTED
THE INEXCUSABLE ACT OF MAKING MATERIAL MISREPRESENTATIONS TO A
COURT.
Attorney fees were granted to the City under § 78-27-56 - that the defense of the Defendant
was without merit and that he did not act in good faith. This Court should not ignore the bad faith
of the City; nor should the material breaches by the City be overlooked. The duty of the Defendant
to perform does not arise until the City tenders performance. Supra. The trial court stated that the
Defendant did not timely remove signs. However, a total four signs were removed, even if tardy.
In contrast the City in bad faith never performed or tendered performance, and is before this court
with unclean hands having deceived the court when it sought the order restricting removal of the
Chamber sign. Attorney fees should not be awarded to the party who is guilty of the greater error.
Defendant does not have unclean hands for failing to timely remove signs while contesting
the City's breaches. Defendant had a legal right to withhold performance. The Court
misapprehended the law considering withholding performance an act of unclean hands or bad faith.
Utah law is clear when attorney fees can be awarded. The threshold to escape an award is
very low. Even if Defendant did not prevail on any claim he may escape an award against him.
See. Watkiss & Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d 1061 (Utah 1991), where this Court stated:
A party may bring a goodfaith action and not prevail Failure of the cause
of action or defense does not automatically require the losing party to pay
costs. If we were to adopt such an approach parties who had difficult but
valid claims would be economically precluded from bringing suit. Watkiss
& Campbell v. Foa & Son. 808 P.2d at 1067-1068.
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The City does not contest that it is guilty of numerous breaches, but simply offers excuses.
The Defendant is entitled to seek redress for these breaches, even if a finding is made that they are
not material. Watkiss is on point and represents the most recent opinion of the Supreme Court.
The Court cited an Arizona case, Wean Water. Inc. v. Sta-Rite Indus.. Inc.. 686 P.2d 1285
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1984). That case is distinguished, first, because the statute is not identical. Second,
there the non-prevailing found was found by clear and convincing evidence to have harassed the
other side. No such claims are present here. In Topik v. Therber. 739 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1987) that
defendant testified falsely. The Defendant here did not testify falsely. However counsel for the
City testified falsely and misled the court into issuing an order restraining the removal of the
Chamber sign when the City had no such right. Topik v. Therber should be applied to the City, not
Defendant. This court should not endorse and condone the bad faith actions of the City by
awarding it attorney fees. The City entered into an agreement which it never honored - as a public
entity it owes a public trust to act in good faith; but failed to notify when it made its decision; failed
to tender proper performance; when it did attempt to perform it ignored its own ordinances repeating the alleged sins which gave rise to the original suit; it then changed the ordinances
destroying the Defendant's consideration to enter into the Stipulation; then its attorneys lie to the
court. If attorney fees are awarded, the City is encouraged it to repeat its bad faith actions again.
Further, the Defendant does not appeal the award of attorney's fees relevant to contempt,
notwithstanding the City's misdeeds. Only attorney fees for the remaining matters are contested.
The issue of whether appellant comes with unclean hands is not before this court, and should not be
considered. Although Defendant acknowledged that he should not have removed the Chamber sign,
following the City's misrepresentation to the court. Defendant will pay those attorney fees, but he
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should not be punished twice by considering that factor here again for the remaining attorney fees.
The Defendant requested his attorney fees under the same statute. The City sought to force
the Defendant to remove signs, without tendering performance. Furthermore the City acted in bad
faith by lying to the Court. There is no showing by the City that it exercised its duties in good faith.
SUMMARY
This Court omitted many critical facts and misapprehended the application of law to those
facts and other facts. The Court should address the fact that the City breached the Stipulation in
every regard, both in act and spirit. It did not purchase or lease a sign; the issuance of permits was
flawed, in bad faith it waited for a new ordinance to be passed outlawing off-premise signs, and
ignored both the former and new ordinance when issuing permits. It never made an attempt to
perform its other duties. But the City was relentless in trying to remove signs. It lied to a trial court
about the Chamber sign. The City owed a duty of good faith, but never manifest it.
Attorney fees should not be awarded the City - they should be granted to the Defendant who
was forced to remove four signs while the City did nothing. He lost thousands of dollars, but the
City did not suffered any damages. Defendant requests that the breaches and bad faith of the City
be examined in light of the law. No court has yet fully addressed the City's acts in failing to
perform or its behavior before the court regarding the Chamber sign incident. This court should
review the all the facts, evidence and testimony to make its own conclusions. These omitted issues
should be considered and addressed in the ruling of this court.
I hereby certify that the foregoing Petition for Rehearing
is in fact presented in good faith and not for purposes of oelay.
Dated this 7th day of Februray, 1997. I
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